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 ABSTRACT 
In the compensation literature, previous studies have indicated that pay-for-
performance has a strong influence on employee performance. However, there is little 
research that differentiates the effects of certain forms of pay-for-performance plans 
on future performance. By applying the precepts of expectancy theory to specific 
components of the pay-for-performance plans, this study examines the relative effects 
associated with three different compensation plans simultaneously on future 
performance.  
Using longitudinal data from a sample of 411 US employees from a service-
related organization, I first estimated the determinants of three pay-for-performance 
rewards and captured differences in their reward structures. Second, I examined the 
impact of the three plans on future performance. In the analyses, using this two-stage 
procedure, the results provided mixed support for the hypotheses. As expected, I found 
that certain characteristics of different forms of financial rewards influenced future 
performance. A unit increase in permanent pay had a greater effect on future 
performance than a unit increase in temporal pay. In addition, I found that the 
compensation system with a greater link between performance and reward magnitude 
had a greater effect on future performance. However, the result did not support the 
prediction that all forms of pay-for-performance are associated with increased future 
job performance ratings.  
This study demonstrates that the effects of pay-for-performance plans on future 
performance can in part be explained by their levels of expectancy and valence, as 
evidence by the effects observed for merit pay and long-term incentives. However, 
contrary to the predictions of expectancy theory, bonuses were not associated with 
increased future performance. Because the design of pay-for-performance plans is a 
critical matter for organizations, future research is needed to refine theory describing 
 how pay-for-performance plans operate simultaneously to affect employee 
performance.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Finding effective solutions to motivate employees to perform through 
monetary incentives has been a primary concern of companies since the 
beginning of the industrial revolution (Bartol & Locke, 2000). To control the 
performance of employees, companies need to realize what motivates employees to 
work for better results (Mitchell, 1982), and it has been frequently argued that if you 
want to motivate high performance, you attach rewards to it (Pearce, Stevenson, & 
Perry, 1985). Unfortunately, while compensation theory presents many perspectives 
on how awards can motivate performance, the tools used to compensate individuals 
come in many forms, and theory does little to differentiate between the various forms 
and types of compensation systems. The purpose of this paper is to delve into this 
issue, and to consider how different forms of compensation are expected to motivate 
higher job performance. 
There are various rewards systems designed to improve performance, such as 
recognition of superior achievement, promises of future promotion opportunities, and 
current and future financial rewards related to performance (Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 
1988). Yet even among cash awards, there can be various forms. Long-term incentives 
focus on performance beyond the one-year time line, whereas short-term incentives 
are usually connected to performance goals accomplished within a single year or a 
shorter time frame (Milkovich & Newman, 2005). Awards can also be one-time 
payments, such as bonuses (Milkovich & Newman, 2005) or permanent increases to 
base pay, such as merit pay (Milkovich & Newman, 2005). In short, compensation 
systems can have many characteristics, and it is likely they will have different effects 
on the potential behaviors incentivized by the plan. Understanding how the 
characteristics of different components of a compensation system influence individual 
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performance can therefore be an important step to help design compensation system to 
encourage the types of behaviors desired by the organization. 
  Many argue that financial incentives have the strongest influence on employee 
performance and other desired behaviors (Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988; Jenkins & 
Gupta, 1982; Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981; Skaggs, Dickinson, & O’Connor, 
1992). This perspective, though, is not without its detractors. Indeed, others also 
contend that incentive plans may not be as effective as they could be in improving 
employees’ performance (Kohn, 1993; Pfeffer, 1998; Rich & Larson, 1984). Because 
incentive plans only change employees temporarily, but do not change the attitudes 
that motivate employee behaviors, they often fail (Kohn, 1993). This negative 
perspective, though, does not question the idea that incentives can motivate; rather, 
they question the use of pay-for-performance as an effective tool for soliciting the 
types of behaviors ultimately desired by an organization. As such, there is general 
agreement that pay-for-performance motivates behavior; the issues, however, are how 
pay-for-performance motivates performance, and if the outcome being rewarded 
actually achieves the broader goals of the organization. 
 In spite of these controversies, compensation practice has moved ahead with 
the implementation of many and varied pay-for-performance systems. Despite the 
significant monetary investments in compensation systems, there is little research that 
looks at the different effects associated with the particular components of 
compensation system that are simultaneously affecting employees. Until recently, 
there are few studies that compared the effects of merit pay and bonuses (Kahn & 
Sherer, 1990; Schwab & Olson, 1990). However, particularly, there is no research on 
the relationship between long-term incentives and employees’ job performance. At the 
same time, there is no study contrasting long-term incentive pay with other pay-for-
performance tools, such as bonuses and merit pay systems. A comparison between 
  3 
long-term incentives and the other two major compensation systems need to be made. 
Recently, many companies are offering long-term incentives to not only executives, 
but also other employees. Overall, these three forms of pay-for-performance are 
increasingly in use by organizations (Heneman, 2005; Joseph & Kalwani, 1998; Pass, 
Robinson, & Ward, 2000; Peck, 1984; Schwab & Olson, 1990; Sturman & Short, 
2000), and are indeed important components of total compensation.  
 While there are a myriad of compensation systems and tools that can be used 
to influence (or at least attach rewards to) employee performance, the purpose of this 
paper is to contrast three major forms of pay-for-performance: long-term incentives, 
merit pay, and bonuses. Ultimately, my goal is to answer the following research 
question: what is the relative effectiveness of the three financial rewards: merit pay, 
individual-based bonuses, and long-term incentives?  By exploring each of the three 
financial rewards and their relative effectiveness, the results of this study will 
contribute theoretically and practically to understanding aspects of different pay 
systems to motivate employees’ performance and, therefore, to designing more 
effective pay-for-performance plans within organizations.  
 To address this question, Chapter 2 focuses on expectancy theory relevant to 
the topic and reviews theoretical and empirical research on the theory. Chapter 3 
discusses different characteristics of three different pay-for-performance plans, an 
application of these characteristics into the two components of the formula from 
expectancy theory, and hypotheses that have been developed. Methodology for testing 
the model is discussed in Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 provides the results of the analyses. 
Discussions from this study follow in Chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
It is believed that employees are motivated to perform better when offered 
something they want (Green, 1992). Theoretically and practically, it is thought that 
affecting motivation is the most effective method of influencing performance (Green, 
1992; Ilgen, Nebeker, & Pritchard, 1981; Mitchell, 1982). Therefore, the application 
of motivation theory may be the most fruitful means of understanding how pay-for-
performance plans can influence employees’ job performance.  
Psychologists have proposed that motivation is a matter of choices to behave 
and it can be combined with ability, expectation, and effort to yield outcomes (Kanfer, 
1990; Mitchell & Daniels, 2003; Vroom, 1964). Researchers have observed 
motivation as a psychological process, showing that individuals become motivated 
when there are needs or desires to fulfill and when there are specific goals to achieve 
(Bandura, 1986; Ford, 1992; Kanfer, 1990; Mitchell, 1982; Mitchell & Daniels, 2003; 
Pinder, 1998). Therefore, people achieve better results on their specific goals with 
higher motivation, and this higher motivation also leads to greater sustained results 
(Mitchell & Daniels, 2003).  
The logic behind pay-for-performance compensation is that linking pay to 
performance can motivate individuals to achieve or sustain greater performance levels 
(Banker, Lee, Potter, & Srinivasan, 1996; Banker, Lee, Potter, & Srinivasan, 2001; 
Fein, 1976; Gerhart & Milkoich, 1990; Heneman & Werner, 2005; Lawler, 1971, 
1981; Milkovich & Newman, 2005; Pearce, Stevenson, & Perry, 1985; Schwab & 
Olson, 1990; Turner, 2006). As a result, a number of forms of pay-for-performance 
plans have emerged, with different mechanisms through which performance is linked 
to pay and with different methods of allocating awards (Milkovich & Newman, 2005; 
Schwab & Olson, 1990). In general, research has repeatedly found that pay-for-
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performance plans do help achieve desired results, at both the individual level (Banker, 
Lee, Potter, & Srinivasan, 1996; Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Eisenberger, Rhoades, & 
Cameron, 1999) and organizational level (Foulkes, 1980; Gerhart & Milkoich, 1990; 
Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1988; Lawler, 1981; Milkovich, 1988; Milkovich & 
Newman, 2005). However, little work discusses how the various forms of pay-for-
performance may differently affect motivation. In this paper, I argue that the 
characteristics of pay-for-performance plans affect motivation in different ways, and 
thus the application of motivation theory, specifically expectancy theory, can provide 
insight into how different pay-for-performance plans can influence employee 
performance levels.  
 This chapter provides a summary of previous research related to the 
relationships between motivation, financial rewards, and job performance to support 
this thesis. Specifically, I focus on expectancy theory to address the following 
question: what is the relative effectiveness of the three financial rewards: merit pay, 
individual-based bonuses, and long-term incentives?  
Expectancy theory is important to compensation research because it has been 
useful for showing how pay plans are capable of encouraging, directing, and 
controlling employee behavior (Gerhart, Minkoff, & Olsen, 1995). More importantly, 
expectancy theory provides a mechanism for differentiating between types of pay-for-
performance plans because the theory specifically speaks to how employees perceive 
rewards and employees’ beliefs among effort, performance and outcome (Ilgen, 
Nebeker, & Pritchard, 1981). Above all, expectancy theory focuses on how rewards 
can shape employees’ behavior (Gerhart, Minkoff, & Olsen, 1995). Although some 
have argued that the theory has methodological limitations on empirical research, I 
will employ more its theoretical concepts in this paper without specifically attempting 
to falsify or expand the theory. 
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In sum, as this chapter will show, expectancy theory provides a means to 
differentiate between different types of pay-for-performance plans. The characteristics 
of a pay-for-performance plan should, therefore, determine changes in job 
performance ratings as employees respond to the incentives of their compensation 
system. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to reviewing the literature on 
expectancy theory and to discussing its applications to the characteristics of pay-for-
performance plans. 
 
Expectancy Theory 
Expectancy theory has been widely applied and has received extensive 
empirical support (Green, 1992; Ilgen, Nebeker, & Pritchard, 1981; Isaac, Zerbe, & 
Pitt, 2001; Johnson, 1991; Mitchell, 1979) among a number of theoretical approaches 
to job motivation (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, & Weick, 
1970; Galbraith & Cummings, 1967; Graen, 1969; Ilgen, Nebeker, & Pritchard, 1981; 
Lawler, 1971; Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964). The theory has been popular 
because it forms the basis of describing and predicting job motivation and behavior 
that lead to future job performance (Wahba & House, 1974). 
 Expectancy theory, popularized by Victor H. Vroom (1964), suggests that 
employees make rational decisions according to their perceptions that are associated 
with certain outcomes and based on their subjective probability that their behavior will 
lead to those outcomes (Mitchell & Daniels, 2003; Wahba & House, 1974). 
Expectancy theory posits that motivation is a function of three beliefs: expectancy, 
valence, and instrumentality.  
Expectancy is the subjective probability of an action or effort leading to an 
outcome or performance (VanEerde & Thierry, 1996; Vroom, 1964). Employee’s 
confidence in their skills for a task, the availability of relevant information, previous 
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experience, and a level of self-esteem can contribute to employees’ expectancy 
perceptions about various levels of job performance (Pinder, 1984).  
Valence is defined as all possible emotional orientations toward outcomes, and 
it is interpreted as the importance, attractiveness, desirability, or anticipated 
satisfaction with outcomes (VanEerde & Thierry, 1996; Vroom, 1964). However, 
valence regarding work-related outcomes in this theory refers to the level of 
satisfaction employees expect to receive from the outcomes, not from the real value 
employees actually derive from them (Pinder, 1984).  
Instrumentality is defined as the belief that performance will lead to rewards 
(Turner, 2006), and it is an outcome-outcome association. In other words, an 
employee subjectively assess that a given performance level will result in one or more 
outcomes, such as pay or promotion (Mitchell & Daniels, 2003). For example, 
performance-outcome instrumentality indicates the perceived relationship between 
one’s performance and one’s outcomes (Ilgen, Nebeker, & Pritchard, 1981; Vroom, 
1964).   
Although Vroom proposed the VEI model with three factors - Valence, 
Expectancy, and Instrumentality - other research has simplified the model by 
subsuming instrumentality into expectancy (Wahba & House, 1974) because of the 
ambiguity of instrumentality to interpret and operationalize (Wahba & House, 1974). 
Therefore, two different versions of the formula can be used to predict employees’ 
future performance (Wahba & House, 1974). The first is VEI model that Vroom 
(1964) proposed.  
Motivation = Valence x Expectancy x Instrumentality                          (1) 
In this model, instrumentality is considered a factor determining the valence of first 
level outcomes (Wahba & House, 1974).  
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The second is VE model which most research has operationalized (Wahba & 
House, 1974), in which it is assumed that instrumentality is a component of 
expectancy. 
Motivation = Valence x Expectancy                                                     (2) 
As most research simplified the theory by subsuming instrumentality into expectancy, 
I will also look at the second formula in this thesis.  
According to the formula, motivation created by these two factors – valence 
and expectancy – lead employees to choose types of behaviors and the level of effort. 
Therefore, expectancy theory suggest that once we find the valences and probabilities 
employees attach to certain outcomes, work-related behavior can (at least in part) be 
predicted (Wahba & House, 1974). According to the theory, performance of 
employees is higher when their motivation and subsequent effort are significantly 
higher with compensation that is based on performance because the compensation 
increases employees’ expectation and their perceptions of outcomes (Bonner & 
Sprinkle, 2002; Green, 1992; Issac, Zerbe, & Pitt, 2001). Expectancy theory has also 
proposed that each individual with self-interest has the desire to maximize preferred 
outcomes to increase pleasure and avoid pain (Issac, Zerbe, & Pitt, 2001; Porter & 
Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964).  
Expectancy theory primarily relies on extrinsic motivators to explain the 
causes of behaviors shown in the workplace (Leonard, Beauvais, & Scholl, 1999). As 
opposed to intrinsic motivators, where behaviors are derived as a consequence of 
internal forces such as enjoyment of the work itself, external rewards induce 
motivational states that stimulate behaviors (Issac, Zerbe, & Pitt, 2001). Specifically, 
the theory emphasizes that greater financial incentives, as outcomes, motivate 
employees because they increase employees’ valence (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). 
Incentive plans can also increase employees’ expectancy by linking effort, 
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performance, and pay (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). As a result, financial incentives can 
increase employees’ effort, and the increased effort can lead directly to higher 
performance (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002).  
It should be noted that some research has also argued that there are limitations 
to expectancy theory (Mitchell & Daniels, 2003). Although much theoretical research 
has been conducted, empirical research has been limited because it has failed to prove 
the theory’s validity due to various errors (Pinder, 1984). First, even though 
expectancy theory is based on a well-designed formula, employees do not often make 
decisions by formula; therefore, the theory has methodological problems (Mitchell & 
Daniels, 2003).  
 Second, it is not clear whether the theory predicts outcomes better for an 
individual (within individual) or for groups of individuals (across individuals) 
(Heneman & Werner, 2005; Mitchell & Daniels, 2003; Pinder, 1998). Some research 
before the mid-1970s has used data for groups (Kanfer, 1990). However, the results 
did not support expectancy theory because these studies did not address differences 
between employees in ability, differences in the level of rewards they received, or the 
difficulty of the jobs they performed (Pinder, 1998). In addition, one study (Mitchell, 
1982) found that correlations between individuals’ predicted effort and their actual 
effort were low - less than .30 (Kanfer, 1990). Recent research has showed that using 
data for individuals better predicts outcomes than for groups of individuals (Mitchell 
& Daniels, 2003; VanEerde & Thierry, 1996). These controversies threaten the 
validity of the VE model for understanding the effects of compensation systems. 
Third, according to the theory, employees must both value outcomes positively 
and believe that their efforts will lead to the positive outcomes; however, one factor, 
the level of ability, has not been fully considered (Pinder, 1984). That is, a high level 
of effort may not lead to high performance because of a lack of ability (Pinder, 1984). 
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Nevertheless, others argue that employees can still choose their level of motivation 
because they believe that employees can enhance their ability through training and 
development activities (Mitchell & Daniels, 2003).  
In sum, expectancy theory cannot perfectly explain motivation; nonetheless, 
the theory provides a useful model for comparing the motivational components of 
different pay-for-performance plans and also provides a tool for comparing different 
characteristics of different components of each pay-for-performance plan. By looking 
at previous empirical research below, I will give a better understanding how each 
component of expectancy theory - valence and expectancy - can be applied to explain 
the relationship between pay-for-performance and job performance.  
 
Empirical Research 
There has been abundant empirical research considering what motivates job 
performance (Eisenberger, Rhoades, & Cameron, 1999; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997; 
Wood, Atkins, & Bright, 1999). Although there has been little work comparing the 
effects of different pay-for-performance plans, and although much of this empirical 
work was not originally designed to test expectancy theory, this research lends 
important insight into the utility of expectancy theory for understanding the influence 
of compensation systems.  
 
Expectancy 
Various studies show how the results of employees’ job performance can differ 
by their expectancies regarding rewards. These following studies demonstrated that 
employees’ job performance increase when employees’ expectancies are higher.  
 
 
  11 
A study of Eisenberger, Rhoades, & Cameron (1999) 
The relationship of rewards for high performance with perceived self-
determination and intrinsic motivation has been examined by Eisenberger et al. In 
their study, they provided an example of employees who had strong expectancies for 
performance and rewards increased their job performance, even though this empirical 
work was not planned to test expectancy theory. They conducted three studies, the first 
in a laboratory setting at a college, the latter two by surveys of employees’ in a 
business setting. The first study evaluated the effects of performance-contingent 
reward on self-determination, perceived competence, and intrinsic motivation. The 
second study examined how expected reward for high performance in usual job 
activities affects employees’ perceived autonomy and related outcomes. Finally, the 
third study examined the relationship between employees’ performance-reward 
expectancies and interest in daily work activities, with this effect being greater among 
employees with a high desire for control. The authors found that reward for high 
performance increase perceived autonomy, intrinsic motivation, and related outcomes. 
The study contradicted the cognitive evaluation theory which states people’s 
expectancy for pay-for-performance decreases self-determination because a reward is 
a form of social control, and thus, reduces intrinsic motivation. In this study, authors 
viewed a reward as “freedom of action”, because people can choose either to obtain 
the reward or not to take the reward. The result of their study has shown that 
performance-reward expectancy increases perceived self-determination, and that 
perceived self-determination positively affects mood at work. In addition, the results 
indicate that perceived self-determination positively mediates the relationships 
between expectancy of performance-reward and perceived organizational support, 
mood at work, and job performance.  
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 Banker, Lee, & Potter (2001) 
Banker, Lee, and Potter (2001) evaluated whether continuing increases in sales 
performance was due to the attraction and retention of more productive employees 
and/or whether it was due to individual productivity gains driven by the improvements 
in employee effort. The authors used data from a retail firm, and analyzed individual 
performance for employees of the sales team. The study found that the implementation 
of a performance-based incentive plan led to the attraction and retention of more 
productive employees and that the plan motivated these employees to continually 
improve their productivity.   
The authors focused on agency theory to support their study in that 
performance based incentive pay leads to increased productivity in the long run. Their 
research also can support expectancy theory in that the pay-for-performance plan met 
employees’ expectancy that their efforts would lead to the bonus pay. The company 
provided training sessions for employees prior to the implementation of performance-
based incentive plan and empowered them to merchandise products and to make 
customer discount decisions. Therefore, the new bonus pay plan improved on 
employees’ performance by stimulating employees’ expectancy. 
 
Pearce, Stevenson, & Perry (1985) 
Pearce, Stevenson, and Perry (1985) found that the implementation of a 
performance-contingent pay program for managers had no effect on organizational 
performance. Therefore, they proposed that merit pay is not an effective method of 
improving managerial performance. In their article, the change in organizational 
performance was measured before and after the implementation of the merit pay 
system. They found that no obvious changes in performance were due to the 
implementation of merit pay.  
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 However, there were some limitations on measuring performance.  First of all, 
the study could not measure what factors might have existed before and after the 
implementation of merit pay because the study did not have a comparable control 
group. Second, although the study was measured for a long term, it could not extend 
back in time enough to discover the cause of performance improvement due to the 
lack of data when they needed to detect the origin of the trend after finding that job 
performance of the employees was improving before the implementation of merit pay. 
It could be assumed that there may be a trend in performance over the study period.  
From an expectancy theory perspective, the reason the implementation of the 
new merit pay system was not directly related to increased performance may be 
attributable to low managerial expectancy because the pay system for increased 
productivity was not clearly explained. Flaws, such as challenges and rumors that 
merit pay would not be awarded to managers, even if they increased their performance, 
could lower the manager’s expectancy of the merit pay.  
 
Banker, Lee, Porter, & Srinivasan (1996)  
Banker, Lee, Potter, & Srinivasan (1996) performed contextual analysis of 
performance impacts of outcome-based incentive which considered contextual factors, 
such as competitors and customer profiles. The intensity of the competition classified 
as high-end, middle and low-end faced by each retail store was measured. The 
customer profile is categorized into median household income, median age, the 
percentage of the population with college education, and the percentage of white collar 
workers. The research found that a positive impact of outcome-based incentives on 
sales, customer satisfaction, and profit increased with intensity of competition and the 
proportion of upscale customers. In addition, the research demonstrated how group- 
level variables are related to individual-level outcomes. Therefore, it allows for the 
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macro processes to have an impact on individuals over and above the effects of 
individual level variables (Roux, 2003).  
The study also examined whether pay-for-performance is effective on 
contingent factors that are complex and difficult to measure, such as customer focused 
service. The results of the study demonstrated that the new bonus plan was successful 
because the retail company examined in this study gave employees high expectations 
of the rewards by explaining clearly the implementation of the bonus plan in detail in 
Q & A sessions. With this empirical test, the result of the study was that a pay-for-
performance plan supported a customer-focused service strategy, and had a high 
impact on store sales, profits, and customer satisfaction. 
 
A summary of expectancy 
In this analysis, a number of studies were reviewed from an expectancy theory 
perspective. The review of these studies regarding the expectancies of employees for 
financial rewards confirms that the levels of expectancies are influential on job 
performance. It showed that the relationships between pay-for-performance plan and 
job performance can be different depending on employees’ beliefs regarding the extent 
to which their successful performance would lead to rewards.  
The results of three studies - Banker et al. (2001), Pearce et al. (1985), and 
Banker et al (1996) - were different even though the settings were very similar. These 
studies tested the effects of the implementation of pay-for-performance plans. The 
new pay-for-performance plans improved employees’ performance when the 
companies delivered the concepts of the plans very clearly, thereby increasing the 
employees’ expectancies. Overall, these studies confirm that employees’ job 
performance increases when employees’ expectancies are higher.  
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From the reviews of these studies, this thesis will advance the application of 
expectancy theory by specifying how employees’ expectancy associated with various 
pay-for-performance plans can lead to different effects of the plans, based on the 
specific characteristics of these plans. The result of this study will also explain why 
some pay-for-performance plans fail to lead to higher performance.  
In this study, I define expectancy as the belief that the subjective probability of 
a certain level of performance leads to large rewards. For example, if under one pay 
system, higher performance would lead to a reward equal to 1.5% of pay, this system 
would have less expectancy than a reward system where the same higher performance 
would lead to a reward equal to 25% of pay.  
 
Valence 
Little research shows that valence motivates employees in different ways. In 
the previous literature, valence was defined as the attractiveness or anticipated 
satisfaction with outcomes (VanEerde & Thierry, 1996; Vroom, 1964) and the level of 
satisfaction people expect (Pinder, 1984).  
 
Stajkovic & Luthans (2001) 
Stajkovic and Luthans (2001) examined the different effects of incentive 
motivators (e.g., monetary incentive, social recognition and feedback) on job 
performance through the organizational behavior modification model (O.B. Mod.) in 
field experiments. The study was aimed at finding the strongest incentive motivating 
performance improvement. Even though the paper found that task complexity could 
moderate the relationship between incentive motivators and performance (for example, 
feedback would have a stronger effect on work performance than money for complex 
tasks because employees who perform high complexity tasks usually have a high 
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education level which is associated with professional and managerial jobs with high 
pay), they confirmed that money has the strongest effects on work performance.  
Money has strong incentive value. It is exchangeable for most other goods and 
different amounts of money correspond to different levels of performance that 
employees have achieved. In addition, money motivates employees because it satisfies 
their needs physiologically and psychologically.   
The study demonstrates that money itself and therefore, different amounts of 
money are the strongest motivator for employees to improve their performance by 
stimulating employees’ valence. 
 
Kahn & Sherer (1990) 
 The results of Kahn & Sherer’s study (1990) showed that the size of bonus pay 
(valence) has a significant effect on job performance. They examined the relationship 
between financial rewards and job performance using longitudinal data on managers. 
First, they found that managers in high-level positions working at corporate 
headquarters with low seniority are more sensitive to bonus plans. Second, the study 
demonstrated that bonus pay had a more significant effect on performance than merit 
pay. More specifically, the pay levels of the company’s bonus pay had considerable 
impact on job performance. The authors proposed that bonuses may be effective 
because current performance can be reflected in bonus pay (Lowery, Petty, & 
Thompson, 1996), whereas there is a gap between current performance and pay 
increases to base pay (Schwab & Olson, 1990). In addition, the authors indicated that 
the flexibility of bonuses, which is not a regular payment, could be an advantage of the 
pay form. However, in the study, bonuses were explicitly targeted to higher-level, 
higher-paid managers who were high performers but merit pay was not. In addition, 
the difference of the size of bonuses across employees was larger than the size of merit 
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pay. Therefore, the merit pay plan in the company might have low valence as well as 
expectancy for employees. The authors simultaneously compared the quantity and 
aspects of rewards systems for the first time (Sturman, 2006). However, the study is 
only compares bonuses and merit pay.   
Kahn & Sherer’s study supports expectancy theory in that when the size of 
rewards (valence) is high, employees are more motivated. The research reflects 
employees’ preference for a higher pay level for a job (Pinder, 1998). Higher valence 
leads to higher employee effort which also leads to higher future job performance. 
 
A summary of valence 
 The above reviews show that pay-for-performance plans can differ by valence 
that employee’s value and the size of their value. These results support the assumption 
of expectancy theory that employees have preferences among different types of 
outcomes, such as money, or preferences among various outcomes, such as pay level. 
They indicate that pay-for-performance plans can be the most effective method when 
employees strongly value money with a belief that they can accomplish what it takes 
to get money (Bartol & Locke, 1951), and when a high level of money is paid.  
From the reviews of these studies, this study will advance the application of 
expectancy theory by redefining valence as the value employees perceived from a 
given monetary reward. But, to clearly differentiate valence from expectancy (which 
could relate to the expected size of a reward), I will consider valence from the 
perspective of the how much employees value each dollar or each percent of a reward. 
Depending on what value employees place on outcomes, effects of motivation on 
valence may differ.  
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A Summary of This Chapter 
Expectancy theory and various empirical studies related to pay-for-
performance plan are reviewed in this chapter. Theoretical concepts and the formula of 
expectancy theory provide a tool to differentiate between types of pay-for-
performance plans by explaining employees’ beliefs and motivation. Although various 
theoretical approaches of expectancy theory have been popularly used for job 
motivation, the theory has not been used in most empirical studies. Nevertheless, these 
studies were reviewed from the expectancy theory perspective, focusing on 
employees’ expectancy and valence of financial rewards. The results of the studies 
reviewed above confirm expectancy theory in that employees are motivated by 
increased expectancy and valence of financial rewards, thereby lending to increased 
performance.  
 
Propositions 
Although many pay-for-performance studies have not initially applied 
expectancy theory, they have provided a useful basis for utilizing the theory to analyze 
the different effects of three major forms of pay-for-performance – merit pay, bonuses, 
and long-term incentives. On the basis of this literature review, I develop three 
propositions to clarify the general relationships between the theoretical concepts of 
expectancy theory and pay-for-performance plans. My hypotheses will be developed 
by applying these general propositions and the characteristics of three different 
financial rewards. 
Proposition 1: pay-for-performance plans that provide greater expectancy will 
lead to high job performance. 
Proposition 2: pay-for-performance plans that provide greater valence will lead 
to high job performance. 
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Proposition 3: pay-for-performance plans that provide greater expectancy and 
valence will lead to greater job performance.  
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES 
 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, a number of studies have shown that pay-
for-performance plans affect employees’ job performance. Although not necessarily 
designed as tests of expectancy theory, this research indicates that employees’ job 
performance improves when employees have higher expectancy and valence. This 
research thus lends support for the use of expectancy theory as a means of explaining 
how pay-for-performance plans affect individual performance; however, few studies 
have discussed how the different forms of pay-for-performance affect employees’ 
motivation and thus, job performance. The purpose of this chapter is to apply 
expectancy theory and specifically the general propositions, of the theory as they 
relate to the particular characteristics of specific pay-for-performance plans in order to 
deduce the different performance effects we can expect. 
This chapter specifically discusses different characteristics of three different 
forms of pay-for-performance – merit pay, bonuses, and long-term incentives. Using 
the theoretical framework of expectancy theory, I analyze how the characteristics of 
these different pay forms lead to certain levels of both expectancy and valence. 
Because different pay forms should have distinct effects on expectancy and valence, 
expectancy theory can, therefore, be used to create hypotheses regarding the relative 
effectiveness of pay-for-performance plans on employee job performance ratings. 
 
Forms of Pay-For-Performance Plans 
 
Merit pay 
 Merit pay is a form of reward in which individuals receive pay increases (i.e., 
raises) as a function of their individual performance ratings (Heneman, 2005). The pay 
  21 
plan is usually based on an individual’s performance and is assessed by an employee 
performance appraisal (Campbell, Champbell, & Chia, 1998; Schwab & Olson, 1990). 
Most importantly, merit pay permanently increases employees’ base pay. Because of 
the specific characteristic of the pay plan, pay ranges are established across jobs or job 
groups (Schwab & Olson, 1990), and pay increases are by the size of the pay range 
(Kahn & Sherer, 1990). Sturman’s study (2006) proposed that merit pay has a greater 
impact on employees’ valence than bonus pay because merit pay is permanent. That is, 
comparing the valence of merit pay to bonuses, the present value of a $1 raise 
(permanent increase) is greater than the present value of a $1 bonus (a one-time 
payment). In addition, from the economic and agency theory perspective, merit pay is 
more desirable than bonuses because employees who are risk-averse prefer permanent 
pay increases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Sturman, 2006). The actual effect of merit pay, 
though, is still dependent on employees’ expectancy. Furthermore, a bonus plan could 
still have greater valence if the potential size of the bonus is larger than the potential 
size of the merit pay (e.g., if the maximum raise of merit pay is 6 %, but a bonus could 
be 20 %).  
Merit pay as pay-for-performance has been frequently used in organizations 
(Peck, 1984; Schwab & Olson, 1990). Although it can be different across industries, a 
number of recent surveys have demonstrated that 80 to 90 % of organizations use 
merit pay plans (Heneman, 2005).  
Problems within the merit pay have arisen (Campbell, Champbell, & Chia, 
1998; Schwab & Olson, 1990). Some researchers have been concerned that 
organizations often failed to link merit pay to employees’ “true” performance because 
of measurement error associated with their performance appraisal system (Campbell, 
Champbell, & Chia, 1998; Schwab & Olson, 1990). In addition, the difference in merit 
pay between the best and the worst performer is often not large (Gomez-Mejia & 
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Balkin, 1989; Greeley & Ochsner, 1986). As shown in Kahn & Sherer’s study (1990), 
if the merit pay range is too small between performers, the plan may fail to motivate 
higher performance. Therefore, the effectiveness of this pay-for-performance plan 
depends on the level of expectancy and valence of the rewards. 
 
Bonuses 
  Bonus pay is a monetary reward given to employees in addition to their fixed 
compensation (Milkovich & Newman, 2005). This pay plan is also based on 
individual performance, but bonus pay dose not increase employees’ base pay, and 
therefore is not permanent (Sturman & Short, 2000). This one-time cash reward links 
pay to performance because current performance can be directly reflected in bonus 
pay (Lawler, 1981; Lowery, Petty, & Thompson, 1996). 
  Bonus pay also has been widely used in organizations to motivate employees’ 
performance (Joseph & Kalwani, 1998; Sturman & Short, 2000). A number of surveys 
reported that the popularity of bonus pay is increasing in organizations (Sturman & 
Short, 2000). Bonus pay is attractive from the company’s point of view because it 
does not increase base pay, and thus does not increase fixed labor costs (Kahn & 
Sherer, 1990; Sturman & Short, 2000).  
  Although bonus pay is flexible, it has similar problems to merit pay (Gomez-
Mejia & Balkin, 1989; Lawler, 1981). Discretionary payment sometimes fails to 
correctly pay for employees’ true performance and the difference between performers 
may not be very significant (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1989; Lawler, 1981). In sum, the 
effectiveness of the bonuses also depends on the level of expectancy and valence of 
the reward. 
 
 
  23 
Long-term incentives 
Long-term incentives are rewards linked to a firm’s long-term growth as well 
as employee retention (Rynes & Gerhart, 2000). The length of the performance period 
in the pay plan is multiyear, whereas other pay plans are usually one year (Ellig, 1982). 
Above all, long-term incentives have been thought to align managers’ and 
shareholders’ goals by allowing top managers to benefit from improved organizational 
performance or firm share price increases by linking a portion of top managers’ pay to 
firm performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, long-term incentives typically 
establish earnings goals to be achieved over a multi-year period and reward 
individuals with cash or stocks (Rich & Larson, 1984). Commonly, companies pay 
long-term incentives with the goal of maximizing employee output (Mitchell, 1982). 
Managers are often accused of focusing on the short term and ignoring the long term 
and their time horizon differs from that of shareholders. Owners do have a long-term 
view of the firm because they expect to increase future profits (Lazear, 1998). 
Therefore, the pay plan can be a key factor which increases managers’ performance 
and encourages employees to adopt other desired behaviors (Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & 
Shaw, 1998). For example, if the stock market reflects the long-term value of the firm, 
then tying managerial compensation to stock price will reward the manager for 
activities that improve long-term performance. 
These incentives have been used to motivate managers, mostly top executives, 
which lead to higher shareholder returns (Devers, Holcomb, & Cannella, 2006). Until 
recently, a large number of companies offer long-term incentives in addition to the 
traditional annual bonuses mostly to compensate the executives of the company (Pass, 
Robinson, & Ward, 2000). However, many firms have recently implemented long-
term incentive plans to other employees (Banker, Lee, Potter, & Srinivasan, 2001; 
Buchholz, 1996; Hamilton, 1999; Karr, 1999; McClain, 1998; Pfeffer, 1998; 
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Schlesinger & Heskett, 1991). For example, in the United States, an estimated 14.6 
million employees presently have stock options in their organizations (Selvarajan, 
Ramamoorthy, Flood, & Rowley, 2006). 
  Problems of long-term incentive plans have been revealed. Although organizations 
pay long-term incentives to retain employees, companies often concern that some 
employees still tend to leave organizations after they receive them. For example, when 
employee stock options are exercised, the commitment and intention to stay decreases 
and external career intent increases because employees’ attachment to their companies 
may decline as a result (Selvarajan, Ramamoorthy, Flood, & Rowley, 2006).  
 In sum, the level of expectancy and valence of the long-term incentives will 
change the effectiveness of the reward. 
 
The Application of Three Different Characteristics of Pay Forms into Two Beliefs 
of Expectancy Theory 
 
With different characteristics of the three financial rewards above and the 
expectancy theory formula, an application to predict employees’ future performance 
can be developed. Expectancy theory suggests considering employees’ beliefs 
regarding effort, performance, and outcomes and the value employees place on certain 
types of rewards and the size of rewards (Ilgen, Nebeker, & Pritchard, 1981).  
 
Expectancy 
According to expectancy theory, employees’ motivation is enhanced when 
their expectancy is increased. Expectancy is increased when employees believe that 
they can achieve what it takes to earn their valued outcomes (Bartol & Locke, 1951). 
In addition, in this study, since as I subsumed instrumentality into expectancy, it is 
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assumed that expectancy will increase when employees believe that they can achieve 
large amount of financial rewards by their performance. In other words, employees 
will have higher expectancy from a reward system when it leads to higher percentages 
of pay.   
 
Valence 
While there is certainly debate as to how effective monetary incentives are on 
motivation, there is clear evidence that they can lead to increased performance (Baker, 
Jensen, & Murphy, 1988; Jenkins & Gupta, 1982; Locke, Feren, McCaleb, Shaw, & 
Denny, 1980; Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981; Skaggs, Dickinson, & O’Connor, 
1992). Furthermore, for the purpose of comparing pay-for-performance plans, even if 
there are within-person differences with regard to employee perceptions of pay, 
characteristics of different plans should have some consistent with across-person 
generalizations (e.g., regardless of how a given person is motivated by money, all else 
equal, a larger reward should be perceived more positively than a smaller reward). 
Therefore, I assume that valence will increase when employees value each dollar or 
each percent of rewards that they received. In this paper, for the purposes of 
comparing the various pay-for-performance plans, I focus on whether the reward 
acquired by the employee is permanent (i.e., a raise), or a one-time payment (from 
bonus or LTI). As will be discussed further below, permanent increases should have a 
higher valence than one-time payments. 
 
Hypotheses 
Combined with the different characteristics of three pay-for-performance plans 
and the components of the formula from expectancy theory, expectancy theory 
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suggests that pay plans with a stronger link between pay and performance should lead 
to greater performance levels. Thus, I predict the following: 
 
H1: All forms of pay-for-performance - merit pay, bonuses, and long- 
term incentives - will be associated with increased future job 
performance rating. 
 
More specifically, though, expectancy theory suggests that the characteristics of the 
compensation system should influence performance ratings, and thus the different 
characteristics of merit pay vs. bonuses vs. long-term incentives should lead to 
different relationships when the three pay-for-performance plans are considered 
simultaneously.  
With different characteristics of the three financial rewards and the expectancy 
theory formula, merit pay should have a greater valence because it provides a 
permanent increase in pay, whereas, bonuses and long-term incentives provide single 
payments. That is, on a dollar per dollar basis, an equal increase in base pay is worth 
more than the temporary (i.e., one-time payment) associated with bonuses or long-
term incentives. In other words, as explained above, the present value of a $1 raise 
(permanent increase) is greater than the present value of a $1 bonus (a one-time 
payment). Therefore,  
 
H2: A unit (i.e., 1%) increase in permanent pay increase will have 
greater effect on future performance than a unit (1%) increase in 
temporal pay. 
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Specifically, this suggests that the B coefficient (i.e., the unstandardized regression 
coefficient), which is the change in response per unit increase in future performance, 
associated with how strongly performance is related to merit pay (i.e., a permanent 
pay increase) should be larger than the B coefficients associated with either the 
relationship between performance and bonuses or the relationship between 
performance and long-term incentives (i.e., both one-time, and hence temporal, 
rewards).  
 A key difference between compensation plans, though, is that the magnitude 
associated with bonuses and/or long-term incentives can be much larger than merit 
increases (Milkovich & Newman, 2005). Thus, while I expected the permanent 
increase in merit pay to provide a greater effect on future performance than the same 
unit amount in other compensation forms, the magnitude of other compensation 
systems has the potential to have a bigger effect on future performance. Put another 
way, expectancy should reflect the extend to which performance is associated with 
larger rewards. If a one standard deviation in performance is associated with a reward 
that is notably larger than the magnitude of raise associated with comparable 
improvement in performance, then expectancy theory also suggests that the 
compensation system should be associated with greater job performance. 
 
H3: A compensation system with a stronger association between 
performance and reward magnitude (i.e. greater expectancy) should be 
associated with greater future employee performance.  
 
This hypothesis means that if a compensation has a greater link between performance 
and reward magnitude (which should be expressed as a greater standardized beta 
coefficient between performance and reward), then, the compensation system should 
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likewise have a greater relationship between pay and performance, expressed as a 
greater standardized beta between the pay-for-performance relationship and 
performance ratings. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample 
I used data contained in the human resource information system from a 
service-related business. For the analyses, data from the years 2003 and 2004 were 
used. Although the company had employees in other countries, I focused on 
employees based in the United States because they are compensated under the same 
rewards system.  
A sample of 411 employees who had compete data on performance ratings, 
salary, organization tenure, gender, and percentage of three financial rewards - merit 
pay, bonuses, and long-term incentives, based on the salary - were collected. All 
employees in the sample were eligible for the three rewards although they did not 
necessarily receive them.  
 
Dependent variable 
To predict the relationship between financial rewards and future performance, I 
used 2004 performance ratings as the dependent variable. Performance ratings are 
measures of employees who companies evaluate based on factors such as employees’ 
behavior, competition among departments (Milkovich & Newman, 2005). They are 
often used to determine the distribution of financial rewards (Landy & Farr, 1980). 
Performance ratings in the company in this study are based on a 4-point scale: 
significantly exceeds expectations, exceeds expectations, meets expectations, and 
below expectations. Performance ratings were transformed to indicator variables from 
1 (lowest performance) to 4 (highest performance).  
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Independent variables 
Since the goal of this study is to explain how the future performance of 
employees was affected by financial rewards - merit pay, bonuses, and long-term 
incentives – these three rewards were used as the independent variables.  
All employees in the sample were eligible for receiving the three rewards, in 
addition to their salaries. The financial rewards were determined by grids, which the 
company specified for each reward. However, the grids specified ranges of rewards 
(i.e., a performance ratings of 4 could lead to a merit raise of 0 % to 0.0675 %), and 
thus, the specific relationship between pay and performance varied within the sample 
for each type of incentive. 
The merit pay plan was based on individual performance. The raise rates of the 
plan were determined by specified grids. For bonus pay plan, the company set targets, 
which were based on the pay band of the employee at the beginning of the year. The 
company paid bonuses which reflected the individual’s performance rating, the 
company’s financial performance, and the judgment of the supervisor at the end of the 
year. Although both the merit pay and bonus pay plan were based on individual 
performance, allocations for these pay plans were also in part dependent on the 
decisions of the supervisor.   
Long-term incentives were based on firm performance. In 2003 and 2004, the 
company distributed restricted stock units to their employees based on a grant grid that 
the company had set. The grid allowed for differentiations based on individual 
performance and criticality of employees’ job position. Employees of the company 
were educated about the financial rewards system via intranet, written communication, 
and training workshops. 
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In this study, I examine these independent variables in terms of percentage of 
rewards per unit performance increase because the amount of each reward is provided 
on the basis of the differentiated salaries of each individual employee.  
 
Control variables 
The main goal of this study is to measure the effect of financial rewards on 
employees’ future performance. Therefore, the previous performance (i.e., 2003) was 
used as a control variable to manage stable characteristics that caused employees’ 
performance (e.g., ability, job knowledge, motivation levels, or opportunities to 
perform) (Sturman, 2003; Sturman, Cheramie, & Cashen, 2005) and unmeasured 
effects that are attributable to factors that also caused the previous performance ratings 
(Sturman, 2007).  
Organization tenure was also used as a control variable because it could 
interfere with testing the main effects of the different characteristics of financial 
rewards on future performance (Sturman, 2003). Sturman’s study (2003) found that 
organization tenure could capture some of non-linearity relationship with 
performance; more specifically, the effect of low levels of organization tenure is larger 
than the effect of high levels of organization tenure.  
Gender differences have been considered one of important factors causing pay 
difference (Milkovich & Newman, 2005). Several reasons such as different treatment 
in performance evaluations, or specific characteristics of gender differences are 
possibly explained. Therefore, to eliminate these potential influences on future 
performance, gender was controlled in this study. Finally, 2003 salary was also 
controlled in this study.  
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Analysis 
I used a technique based on Kahn & Sherer’ procedures (1990) to predict the 
impact of three different financial rewards on the future job performance. Kahn & 
Sherer used a two-stage procedure for estimating the impact of financial incentives on 
performance. The study examined the determinants of bonus and merit pay awards in 
the first stage. After the first stage, they estimated the derivative of financial rewards 
with respect to performance of individual employees. Finally, the study measured the 
determinants of subsequent performance by using the estimated derivatives and other 
variables.  
Although I used an approach based on Kahn & Sherer’s procedures (1990), I 
developed some different equations between the first stage and the second stage to 
estimate the effect of performance on pay. The reason I employed this different 
approach is that Kahn & Sherer’s approach is complex and not easily interpreted. The 
equations used in this study are based on actual value, divided by the percentage of 
individual financial reward by previous performance (i.e., 2003), whereas Kahn & 
Sherer’s equations (1990) estimated the predicted value from the previous equation 
which was developed in the first stage. The new equations are simpler and more 
straightforward than Kahn & Sherer’s equations because they provide a direct measure 
of how much a reward increased per point of performance. The equations show the 
individual employee’s pay-for-performance experience for each of the different 
financial rewards. 
First of all, to estimate the determinants of merit pay, bonuses, and long-term 
incentives, I used data on organization tenure, gender, 2003 salary, and 2003 
performance on the resultant (same year) financial rewards (i.e., 2003). Equations 
were developed for estimating the determinants of the three financial rewards and 
capturing differences in the rewards. This stage provides an estimate of the parameters 
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of the financial rewards and an understanding of the pay-for-performance plans of the 
company.   
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Where Merit pay % = (2003 merit pay in dollars) / (2003 salary); bonuses %= (2003 
bonuses in dollars) / (2003 salary); LTIP% = (2003 long-term incentives in dollars) / 
(2003 salary). 
The equations (1), (2), and (3) explain the effect of the year’s performance on 
the rewards received for that year and the determinants of each reward. These models 
explain, on average, what determines each of the financial rewards. More importantly, 
it shows the effects that 2003 performance has on the 2003 rewards. 
The equations (4), (5), and (6) below were used to estimate the progressive 
effect of individual performance combined with each of financial rewards. In other 
words, these models explain “the sum of the effects of performance on financial 
rewards” (Kahn & Sherer, 1990). These equations provide an approximation of the 
strength of the pay-for-performance relationship for each individual employee.  
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Where PFPMerit = merit pay percentage with respect to 2003 performance; 
PFPBonuses = bonus pay percentage with respect to 2003 performance; PFPLTIP = 
long-term incentive percentage with respect to 2003 performance. 
 
Hypotheses tests 
In the second stage, I used the estimated parameters from the first stage and the 
PFP proxies (i.e., from equations 4, 5, and 6) along with the control variables of 
organization tenure, gender, 2003 salary, and 2003 performance, to predict future 
performance (i.e., 2004 performance), as shown in equation (7). This provides an 
estimate of the determinants of future performance. 
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The equation (7) is a reduced-form estimate because it is assumed that 2004 
performance includes “previous pay variables,” percentages of financial rewards 
(Kahn & Sherer, 1990). All of the equations will be fit using OLS regression. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for the variables in this study.  
 
Table 1 
Summary of sample 
 
Characteristics Data 
Sample size 411 
Gender 
Female: 47.20 %, Male: 51.34 %, 
Missing data: 1.46 % 
 Mean SD Range 
Org. Tenure (year) 8.64 6.90 2 ~38 
2003 salary ($) 102,130.71 38,361.19 30,000~255,000 
2004 salary ($) 104,854.78 39,522.72 30,000~260,100 
2003 merit pay % 0.022 0.015 0 ~ 0.068 
2003 bonuses % 0.109 0.075 0 ~ 0.381 
2003 Long-term incentive plan % 0.111 0.197 0 ~ 1.228 
PFPMerit 0.0086 0.0048 0 ~ 0.02 
PFPBonuses 0.0441 0.0314 0 ~ 0.182 
PFPLTIP 0.0441 0.0776 0 ~ 0.532 
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Table 2 presents correlations for these variables. Performance for 2003 and 
2004 had a significantly positive relationship (r = .31, p < .01). However, the 
coefficient of the relationship was lower than that found in previous research. Sturman 
(2005) showed that the average correlation between subjective performance ratings of 
highly complex jobs was .59. However, upon greater reflection, the characteristics of 
the dataset considered here make the observed correlation seem reasonable. This study 
used a 4-point scale, which is a coarse measure of performance rating that likely 
attenuated the relationship between 2003 and 2004 performance. Furthermore, the 
performance rating is a single item measure which further attenuates the relationship 
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
The salaries of 2003 and 2004 had a significantly negative relationship with 
organization tenure (r = - .11, p < .05). It appears that employees who received higher 
salaries were not those with longer tenure in the company. However, 2004 salary 
correlated strongly with the salary of the previous year (2003 salary) (r = .9975, p 
< .0001). 
 The percentages of all financial rewards were significantly related to 2003 and 
2004 performance. The percentage of merit pay had a significant positive relationship 
with 2003 performance (r = .67, p < .0001), and a smaller but also significant 
relationship with 2004 performance (r = .23, p < .0001). The percentage of bonus pay 
percentage was significantly correlated with 2003 performance (r = .29, p < .0001), 
while it had a smaller but also significant relationship with 2004 performance (r = .11, 
p < .05). However, the percentage of long-term incentive had a roughly the same 
relationship with 2004 performance (r = .18, p < .01), as it did with 2003 performance 
(r = .16, p < .01).  
The percentages of bonuses and long-term incentives had significantly positive 
relationships with salary, but the percentage of merit pay did not. The correlation 
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between the percentage of bonus pay and salary was significant for 2004 (r = .57, p 
< .0001); for 2003 (r = .55, p < .0001). The percentage of long-term incentives was 
significantly related with salary for 2004 (r = .66, p < .0001); for 2003 (r = .65, p 
< .0001). 
Table 2 indicates that PFPMerit was highly correlated with 2003 performance 
(r = .38, p < .01), and had a smaller but also significant relationship with 2004 
performance (r = .13, p < .01). In addition, PFPMerit was significantly correlated with 
the percentage of financial rewards. It had a significantly positive relationship with 
Merit pay percentage (r = .90, p < .0001), and smaller but also significant relationships 
with bonus pay percentage (r = .33, p < .0001) and long-term incentive plan 
percentage (r = .14, p < .01).  
PFPBonuses was a positively associated with 2003 and 2004 salaries (r = .55, 
p < .0001). It was significantly related to three financial reward percentages. It had a 
significant relationship with merit pay percentage (r = .12, p < .01), bonus pay 
percentage (r = .92, p < .0001), long-term incentive percentage (r = .58, p < .0001). It 
had also a significant relationship with PFPMerit (r = .24, p < .0001). 
PFPLTIP  had significant relationships with most variables, except 2003 
performance. PFPLTIP was significantly related to 2004 performance  
(r = .14, p < .01). However, it had a significant negative relationships with 
organization tenure (r = - .15, p < .01). 
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Predicting compensation levels 
The estimates of the predictors of the 2003 rewards based on the 2003 
performance (and control variables) are shown in Table 3. The table demonstrates the 
impact of variables that may affect the three types of rewards. The coefficient B serves 
as an approximation of expectancy in that it captures the extent to which performance 
leads to larger rewards. The results indicate that previous performance (i.e., 2003) was 
the most significant factor for the percentage of merit pay (B = .015, p < .01), bonus 
pay percentage (B = .034, p < .01), and long-term incentives (B = .060, p < .0001). 
Interestingly, gender (B = .006, p < .05) and 2003 salary (B= .132, p < .0001) also 
affected bonus pay percentage. For long-term incentive percentage, organization 
tenure was negatively significant (B = - .003, p < .01), while 2003 salary (B = .384, p 
< .0001) was significantly positive. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  40 
Lo
ng
-t
er
m
 In
ce
nt
iv
e 
%
 
B 
   
   
 0
.0
60
0*
**
 
(0
.0
10
) 
  -
0.
00
27
**
 
(0
.0
01
0)
 
0.
01
12
 
(0
.0
07
6)
 
   
  0
.3
83
9*
**
 
(0
.0
21
9)
 
0.
48
 
       
Bo
nu
s p
ay
 %
 
B 
   
   
0.
03
44
**
* 
(0
.0
04
1)
 
0.
00
05
 
(0
.0
00
4)
 
  0
.0
06
2*
 
(0
.0
03
0)
 
   
   
 0
.1
31
8*
**
 
 (0
.0
08
8)
 
0.
42
 
       
M
er
it 
pa
y 
%
 
B 
   
   
0.
01
52
**
* 
(0
.0
00
8)
 
0.
00
00
 
(0
.0
00
0)
 
0.
00
02
 
(0
.0
00
6)
 
0.
00
07
 
(0
.0
01
8)
 
0.
45
 
  
20
03
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
O
rg
. t
en
ur
e 
G
en
de
r 
Lo
g 
20
03
 S
al
ar
y 
R
-S
qu
ar
e 
N
ot
es
:  
N
 =
 4
11
; +
 p
 <
 .1
0;
 *
 p
 <
 .0
5;
 *
* 
p 
< 
.0
1;
 *
**
 p
 <
 .0
00
1.
 
Ta
bl
e 
3 
Fi
rs
t s
te
p 
re
gr
es
sio
n 
re
su
lts
 
(S
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
) 
  41 
Impact of financial rewards 
The results of the regression analyses of the second stage are presented in 
Table 4. The five models provide information on the impact of financial rewards on 
future performance. Standardized beta shows how strongly each variable is related to 
future performance. 
After controlling for the effects of organization tenure, gender, 2003 salary, 
and 2003 performance, 2003 salary (B= .261,  = .142, p < .01) and 2003 
performance (B= .283,  = .307, p < .01) had significant effects on 2004 performance. 
The results also indicate that the control variables are significantly related to future 
performance.  
The next three models provide information on the effects of each financial 
reward on future performance. When PFPMerit  was introduced into the second 
model (B), the effects of 2003 salary and 2003 performance remained the same as in  
model A. Table 4 also shows significant effects on 2003 salary and 2003 performance 
when PFPBonuses are added in model C. When PFPLTIP  was introduced in the 
fourth model (D), the effect of long-term incentives on 2004 performance was 
significant (B=1.180,  = .157, p <.05).  
Finally, when all variables are included in model E, the result indicates that the 
combined effects of the three financial rewards were significant for 2004 performance. 
PFPMerit and PFPLTIP were positively affected future performance (B for PFPMerit: 
10.512,  = .079, p <.10; B for PFPLTIP: 1.816,  = .241, p <.01) However, it is 
noted that the effect of PFPBonuses  negatively influenced future performance (B = - 
3.833,  = - .186, p < .01). Contrary to the hypotheses, the results indicate that 2004 
performance decreased as employees received increased bonuses. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
 
In this study, I examined the relationships between three different forms of 
compensation (merit pay, bonuses, and long-term incentives) and future performance 
by analyzing existing pay-for-performance plans in a service-related organization.   
Based on the predictions of expectancy theory, I developed hypotheses that 
differentiated between the effects of the various pay-for-performance plans. In general, 
expectancy theory suggests that a compensation plan with greater expectancy and 
greater valence should motivate employees to perform better. This suggests that by 
considering the expectancy and valence of different forms of compensation (i.e., 
different types of pay-for-performance plans), it is possible to differentiate between 
the types of effects we may expect from each. Thus, the main goal of this study was to 
look at the different effects associated with the particular components of the 
compensation system that simultaneously affect employees. As a result, this study 
reviews the components of expectancy theory and the certain characteristics of three 
different financial rewards, and predicts employees’ future performance by combining 
them.  
The results of this study provided mixed support for the hypotheses, but in 
general, the effects associated with different pay-for-performance plans as related to 
future performance scores are very interesting. As expected, the results from the first 
stage indicates that previous performance is the most significant factor to determine 
financial rewards (B for merit pay percentage: .015, p < .0001; B for bonus pay 
percentage: .034, p < .0001; B for long-term incentive percentage: .060, p < .0001). In 
other words, performance levels in a given time period were indeed associated with 
the reward linked with different pay-for-performance plans in the same time period. In 
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addition, Table 1 shows that one point improvement of performance, on average, is 
associated with a 4.41 % payout of long-term incentives on base pay. However, an 
employee receives 0.86 % raises of merit pay on base pay by improving performance 
by one point. The range of long-term incentive raises in this company was 0 % to 
122.75 % of salary, and an average was 11.15 %. However, the range of merit pay 
raises in this company was 0 % to 6.8 % of salary, and an average was 2.3 %. Indeed, 
it seems that the size of long-term incentive is very large. Therefore, this result shows 
that long-term incentives have a large expectancy because employees can expect an 
increase in performance to lead to a large payout. Conversely, merit pay seems to have 
low expectancy because an increase in performance yields a relatively raise. 
The second stage of the analyses examined how the pay-for-performance plans 
relate to future performance. These results, however, provided mixed support for the 
hypotheses. I originally assumed that all forms of pay-for-performance would 
motivate employees to increase their performance. Cursory examination of 
correlations seemed to support this idea, in that the correlation between the pay-for-
performance plans and future performance were all positive and significant (r for merit 
pay percentage: .23, p < .0001; r for bonus pay percentage: .11, p < .05; r for long-
term incentive plan percentage:  .18, p < .01).  
The regression analyses, though, included more than simply the association; it 
controlled for the effects of prior performance, and also considered the various forms 
of pay-for-performance simultaneously. The intent of the analyses was to provide a 
clearer indication of the effect that each plan had on future performance. As predicted, 
PFPMerit (B = 10.51,  = .079, p < .10) and PFPLTIP (B = 1.82,  = .24, p < .01) 
were positively associated with future performance. However, contrary to expectation, 
bonuses had a significantly negative association with future performance (B = -3.83, 
 = - .19, p < .01). 
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The results of the second stage show that the effect associated with 1% of 
merit pay (B = 10.512, p < .10) is larger than the other rewards (B for PFPBonuses: -
3.833, p < .01; B for PFPLTIP: 1.816, p < .01). Therefore, it is supportive of 
hypothesis 2 which predicted that permanent increases would have more valence than 
temporary increases.  
Long-term incentives have the greatest affect on future performance (   for 
PFPLTIP: .24;   for PFPMerit: .078,   for PFPBonuses: - .19). The standardized 
beta shows the effect associated with a one standard deviation increase in the reward 
amount. Therefore, the results confirm hypothesis 3 because long-term incentives in 
this company are associated with the highest level of future performance because of its 
stronger link between performance and reward magnitude (larger expectancy).  
Overall, the results of this study provide mixed support for expectancy theory. 
They showed that pay-for-performance plans with some expectancy and valence were 
associated with future job performance levels. However, they could not explain why 
bonuses are not associated with increased future performance.  
Some previous empirical research has shown evidence that financial incentives 
sometimes do not lead to increased effort and improved performance (Bonner, Hastie, 
Sprinkle, & Young, 2000; Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Guzzo, Jette, & Katzell, 1985; 
Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998; Lee, Locke, & Phan, 1997; Prendergast, 1999; 
Wright, 1989, 1990, 1992; Wright & Kacmar, 1995). Cognitive-evaluation theory 
(Deci, Betley, Kahle, Abrams, & Porac, 1981; Deci & Ryan, 1985) suggested that 
monetary incentives make employees focus more on the external reward related to a 
task, and therefore, decreasing intrinsic motivation and can decrease effort and task 
performance (Bonner &  Sprinkle, 2002). However, financial incentives can be 
considered as an intrinsic reward because employees enhance their feelings of 
achievement or self-esteem by receiving the monetary incentive (Guzzo, 1979).  
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Previous research has specifically suggested that bonuses help motivate 
employees. Some have provided specific recommendations, such as that bonuses in 
pay plans should represent 5 to 10 % of base pay (Heneman, Ledford, & Gresham, 
2000). The range of bonus pay raises in this company was 0 % to 40 % of salary, and 
the average was 10 %. However, it seems that large bonuses actually seemed to 
demotivate employees in this company. It is possible that this outcome may relate to 
“weak performance-outcome relationships” or that the company might have vague 
performance criteria or infrequent pay outs (Kuvaas, 2006). However, this is not 
consistent with my finding regarding long-term incentives. It is possible that bonuses, 
because they had lower expectancy than long-term incentives, higher expectancy than 
merit pay, lower valence than merit pay, and, higher valence than long-term incentives, 
being in this “middle” situation, were ineffective performance drivers. In any case, the 
unexpected results regarding bonuses cannot be explained by this data, and future 
research should look into whether this effect is unique to this dataset, or if there are 
more general issues at stake when employees are compensated with multiple pay-for-
performance plans simultaneously.  
This research has a number of advantages over previous studies on pay-for-
performance. First, it used longitudinal data controlling for prior performance to 
examine the effects of pay-for-performance plans on future performance. Second, the 
study considered the different effects of certain characteristics of multiple pay-for-
performance plans simultaneously. Moreover, it applied certain components of the 
pay-for-performance plans to the formula of the expectancy theory to predict future 
performance. 
This study, however, is not without limitations. The longitudinal data was 
limited to only two years in one company in one country. To detect a causal 
relationship that might exist, more periods should be tested in order to make 
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conclusive statements (Kuvaas, 2006). In addition, this study is only based on archival 
data. The results were inferred from the relationship between pay and performance for 
expectancy and based on the characteristics of the plans for valence. While this is not 
the first study to examine pay-for-performance plans in this way (Kahn & Sherer, 
1990), it would be valuable to more specifically assess employee perceptions of 
expectancy and valence of the pay-for-performance plans. 
Understanding how the characteristics of compensation plans affect future 
performance is crucial for organizations to design competitive pay-for-performance 
plans. This study makes an important contribution to the literature by examining the 
true relationships between pay-for-performance plans and future performance and by 
investigating certain characteristics of pay-for-performance plans. Yet, despite these 
contributions, the limitations in this study provide much room for future research. 
Further study should be pursued to clarify the influences on future performance and 
how different compensation plans affect employee motivation.  
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